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1. INTRODUCTION
The development of advanced methods for fault man-
agement in Nuclear Power Plants plays an important role 
in increasing the safety and reliability of nuclear plant 
operations. Recent surveys by IAEA [1] compare meth-
odologies currently considered by the nuclear industry 
for fault detection, identification, diagnosis and recovery. 
Most of the methods rely on advanced signal process-
ing or artificial intelligence techniques and can be used 
to increase the level of automation in fault management. 
However, in fault situations with potentially serious con-
sequences for the plant or the environment, operators are 
often responsible for taking action. Fault management 
tasks can therefore only be automated to a certain extent, 
depending on the risk involved and whether there is a 
possibility for the operator to take action. Experiences 
from the nuclear industry shows that bad HMI design in-
creases the risk of human error. The design of the human 
machine interaction and decision support is therefore of 
considerable importance in addition to automated func-
tions for fault management. 
The fault management task comprises several sub-
tasks including monitoring, fault detection, identification, 
diagnosis and fault recovery. In this paper we will focus 
on diagnosis, which is a critical step in the overall man-
agement of faults and we will consider methods suitable 
for handling faults in complex systems like nuclear pow-
er plants. The purpose of diagnosis is to identify causes 
and consequences of a given fault situation. This task is 
knowledge intensive and can be very demanding in dy-
namic situations. Advanced methods for diagnosis there-
fore often apply modelling techniques for representation 
of plant knowledge relevant for diagnosis. 
The aim of the paper is to describe a modelling tech-
nique called functional modelling and explain how it can 
be used for diagnosis of complex systems like nuclear 
power plants. The paper is divided into four parts. The 
first part comprise the remainder of the introduction and 
provides a brief survey of methods for diagnosis explain-
ing the special features of functional modelling into con-
text of other methods. The second part presents a general 
analysis of modelling requirements for diagnostic tasks 
which serve as a demonstration of the relevance of func-
tional modelling for diagnosis of complex systems. The 
third part provides an introduction and demonstration 
of Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM), an explanation 
of the basic principles of diagnostic reasoning in MFM 
and a demonstration of a simple cooling system example. 
The last part describes results from two nuclear power 
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plant applications of MFM. 
MFM has been developed over a long period of time 
and many publications are available describing differ-
ent aspects of its application, also within nuclear power 
systems. The purpose of the present paper is to present 
previously unpublished work which provides a broader 
background and motivations for using MFM for diagno-
sis (especially parts 1 and 2), and for handling the model-
ling requirements in complex systems like nuclear power 
plants (part 4). The reader is referred to the references 
for details.
1.1 Methods for Fault Diagnosis
Methods for fault diagnosis use a variety of tech-
niques which have their origin in signal processing and 
artificial intelligence and are sometimes classified ac-
cordingly. However, such a classification is not suitable 
for explaining the merits of functional modelling for fault 
diagnosis, the subject of the present paper. A more useful 
classification is a distinction of methods according to the 
nature of the plant knowledge used for fault diagnosis. 
Such a classification of methods is proposed by IAEA [1] 
and is a convenient starting point for explaining the sig-
nificant features of functional modelling. 
1.1.1 The IAEA classification
The IAEA classification includes methods currently 
(2008) considered in Nuclear Engineering and makes the 
following overall distinctions
• Empirical modelling
• Physical modelling
•  Related techniques including fuzzy logic and multi-
level flow modelling
We will shortly discuss this useful, but still problem-
atic, classification in order to highlight the significant 
features of functional modelling. Here it is included 
in “related techniques” by Multilevel Flow Modelling, 
which is a method for functional modelling proposed 
by the first author [2]. The IAEA classification is prob-
lematic because the third category is simply a residual 
containing methods not belonging to the first two catego-
ries. Significant features of all the methods mentioned is 
therefore missing in the classification. A main aim of the 
first part of the present paper is to explain the principles 
of functional modelling so its distinctive features com-
pared with both empirical and physical modelling and its 
potential applications for fault diagnosis in nuclear power 
plants become clear.
1.1.1.1 Empirical modelling
Empirical methods use pattern recognition techniques 
to compare plant observations with previously identified 
fault situations and have been used both for fault detec-
tion and diagnosis. An advantage of empirical techniques 
is the independence of detailed knowledge of plant be-
havior. However, a disadvantage is that fault situations 
are defined by patterns of observed plant variable values. 
It may accordingly be difficult to diagnose faults which 
have not been encountered before. The pattern recogni-
tion algorithm may fail because it is fitted to the empiri-
cal data and a learning approach is required. Empirical 
modelling also includes fault trees and consequence trees 
which are produced as results of fault analysis and both 
used in off-line applications for risk assessment and for 
on-line applications for identification of failure causes 
and consequences. A significant problem with empirical 
methods is that faults are defined by expert judgments, 
i.e., there is no systematic basis for defining faults and 
thereby to ensure completeness or consistency.
1.1.1.2 Physical modelling
Methods based on physical modelling use first princi-
ples, i.e., laws of physics and chemistry. The models are 
used for fault diagnosis by analyzing deviations between 
observations and plant parameters estimated by the mod-
el. In this way the physical models compensate for lack 
of measurements and contribute to a higher accuracy in 
fault diagnosis. When using methods based on physical 
models, a fault is defined as a deviation from a model 
which represents what is considered to be normal. An ad-
vantage of methods based on physical modelling is that 
faults can be defined in a more rigorous way compared 
to empirical methods. However, defining the normal by 
the behavior of the model - and faults as deviations from 
the model - puts an unnecessarily severe restriction on 
the definition of faults and what is considered as normal. 
Faults cannot be seen as logical complements of the be-
havior specified by a physical model since their defini-
tion include consideration of norms and requirements i.e. 
plant goals and functions. Requirements are described 
by constraints on physical entities, but their relations 
do not follow the first principles of physics and chem-
istry. Functional modelling, described below, represents 
requirements, and provides, therefore, a more satisfying 
framework for the definition of faults.
1.1.1.3 Related techniques
This is a residual category, as mentioned above, and 
includes two methods: “fuzzy logic” and “multilevel 
flow modelling;” which does not have much in common, 
except that they are both results of artificial intelligence 
research in knowledge representation and reasoning. The 
purpose of fuzzy logic is to deal with vagueness and un-
certainty in reasoning, whereas the purpose of functional 
modelling is to represent systems as purposeful entities. 
Fuzzy logic may actually be used to reason about un-
certainty in functional modelling (as with other types of 
knowledge) but the possibility of combining functional 
modeling and fuzzy logic is no reason to see them as be-
longing to the same category. We will not discuss fuzzy 
logic further here.    
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model for diagnosis must represent system features, so 
that information from plant measurements can be related 
to possible plant failures and possible remedial actions. 
These requirements to models for diagnosis are well un-
derstood, but it is in general difficult to translate the re-
quirements into a model. The main problem is a general 
lack of explicit principles for construction of models for 
diagnosis. 
As mentioned above, a widely used principle for di-
agnosis is to use empirical models representing relations 
between plant fault states, their causes and their conse-
quences. Several modelling tools have been developed 
for representing fault trees and cause consequence dia-
grams. However, the modelling tools do not assist the 
engineer in addressing the interpretation problem in the 
selection of model content, i.e., to decide what is relevant 
to represent for a particular reasoning task and for a spe-
cific plant. The model builder is therefore faced with a 
difficult interpretation problem, and the identification of 
failure causes and consequences to include in the empiri-
cal model is far from trivial.
These interpretation problems in building empirical 
models for diagnosis will be analyzed below using a fault 
analysis example of an industrial process. Results of the 
analysis indicate that the construction of a fault tree of 
the process is based on an extensive body of background 
knowledge of diagnostic strategies, and of plant knowl-
edge that can be organized in the means-end modelling 
framework provided by functional modelling. The plant 
operational knowledge captured in functional models is 
therefore more generic than the empirical knowledge 
represented in a fault tree. 
2.1 Interpretation Problems
The overall purpose of diagnosis is to interpret the 
significance of deviations in plant states from their ex-
pected values. Usually, several interpretations are possi-
ble depending on the specific diagnostic goal that may be 
dependent on the situation. Three main types of diagnos-
tic goals can be distinguished.
1.  In some situations the diagnostic goal is to relate 
the symptoms of plant malfunction to a possible 
failed component or subsystem with the aim of re-
pairing or exchanging the failed component. It is 
clear that such a goal would only be acceptable, if 
the plant supervisor (human or machine) is allowed 
to take the failed entity out of service and has suf-
ficient time available for repair. 
2.  These conditions are not met if there are no spare 
parts or if overall requirements to plant production 
cannot be satisfied during the period of repair. In 
such situations it would be necessary to find means 
of compensation for the failure that avoid the re-
moval of the failed component. It could be by us-
ing components or subsystems which can provide 
the function of the failed entity. Accordingly, the 
1.1.2 Functional modelling – a missing category
It is actually more relevant to compare functional 
models with physical models. The purpose of physical 
models is to represent the physical constraints of the 
system which determine its behavior when subject to 
changes in selected inputs. The purpose of functional 
modelling is to represent constraints between the goals 
and the functions of the system and its subsystems, i.e., 
the means and the ends which define how it is operated. 
The conceptual basis of functional modelling is means-
end and action concepts, whereas the basis of physical 
modelling is the theory of dynamic systems and phys-
ics. A significant feature of functional modelling is its 
definition of faults as deviations from goals and purposes 
or intentions. As shown below, this definition of faults 
matches very well with a general understanding of the 
fault diagnosis problem in complex systems like nuclear 
power plants. We see accordingly functional modelling 
as defining a separate model category which is missing 
in the IAEA classification.
Functional modelling can be considered as a type of 
first principles model. The first principles are not given 
by laws of nature, but by necessary logical constraints 
between faults, goals, tasks and plant functions, and ex-
ecution of actions. These principles reflect conditions for 
successful action and following Polanyi [5] we call them 
first principles of operation. Each condition for success-
ful action in functional modelling define a failure type, 
and since functional modelling (MFM) supports formal 
causal reasoning, it provides a systematic framework for 
fault diagnosis.
Another significant difference is that functional mod-
elling is qualitative by representing logical relations be-
tween means and ends whereas physical modelling is 
quantitative by representing relations between the values 
of plant variables. This means that functional modelling 
and physical modelling differ in two aspects: 1) by the 
nature of the knowledge represented (goals and functions 
versus behavior) and 2) by the distinction between quali-
tative and quantitative.
Below we will show that functional modelling also 
can be contrasted with empirical modelling because we 
can see fault and consequence trees as empirical shal-
low representations of the deep knowledge represented 
in functional models. 
2. MODELLING FOR FAULT DIAGNOSIS
To provide further motivations for using functional 
modelling in diagnosis we will shift the focus from the 
models currently used for fault diagnosis in NPP to a 
more general analysis of the fault diagnosis task. In par-
ticular, we will discuss how the task influences the levels 
of abstraction used in the model. A model is a tool and 
its level of detail and abstraction must comply with the 
needs of the diagnosis task. Overall, this means that a 
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cal concepts. The mathematical interpretation is only de-
pendent on the logical structure of the fault tree and is 
sufficient for making logic inferences. It is independent 
of the plant states that are referred to by the propositions, 
i.e., of the factual interpretation of the fault tree. 
It is the problem of assigning factual content to the 
propositions in the fault tree which is of interest in the 
present paper. But a fault tree does not contain explicit 
information about the criteria used to select plant fault 
states or the strategy used to derive their interdependen-
cies. This information is given by a factual interpretation 
of the fault tree and depends, as shown below by the ship 
engine cooling system example, both on plant knowl-
edge and on the diagnostic strategy used.
2.2.1 A Ship Engine Cooling System Example
The following analysis of the example fault tree 
(Fig.1) of a ship engine cooling system (Fig.2) reveals 
the implicit knowledge. The aim of the analysis is to 
reconstruct the interpretation required to build the fault 
tree. In this way we will identify the diagnostic and plant 
knowledge that serves as a background context for the 
model. We will also show that this background knowl-
edge can be represented using functional modelling.
The cooling system is used in e.g. ship diesel engines 
[5] and consists of two water circulation loops connected 
by a heat exchanger. The primary purpose of the heat ex-
changer is to transfer energy from the engine fresh water 
circulation loop to the seawater circuit, and a second-
ary purpose is to prevent the seawater from entering the 
engine construction. Similar principles are used in core 
cooling systems for pressurized nuclear power reactors. 
Here the primary purpose is also cooling, but the sec-
ondary purpose is to prevent the release of radioactive 
materials from the core to the environment. In order to 
simplify the analysis we will ignore plant incidents that 
require protective actions, i.e., shut downs or emergen-
cies. An example of such a situation could be a sudden 
loss of primary coolant water from the engine; somewhat 
similar to a LOCA in a nuclear power reactor. We have 
selected the ship engine cooling system because of its 
relative simplicity and because of its similarity with the 
principles of NPP coolant systems.
The purpose of the cooling system is to keep the tem-
perature of the engine within acceptable limits. Too high 
temperatures of the cylinders of a diesel engine can lead 
to breakage of the cylinder linings. A consequence of 
such failure can be loss of propulsion, a serious condi-
tion for a ship in narrow waters or in high traffic. The 
cooling system is therefore equipped with both a redun-
dant flow path for the seawater and a water tank that can 
function as an independent auxiliary cooling system in 
case both seawater flow paths fail. The stop valves are 
used to switch and configure the system for different 
cooling modes. Three modes are provided: 1) a normal 
mode, where pump P2 delivers the driving pressure; 2) 
diagnostic goal is here to ensure that the plant op-
erational goals are maintained in spite of the fault.
3.  However, in situations with high risk and uncer-
tainty it can be a dangerous decision to repair or 
to compensate the fault. Under such circumstances 
the goal of the diagnosis should be to derive and 
evaluate possible consequences of the failure and 
to provide protective action (e.g. shut down). In 
this case the decision to act could be done without 
knowing the prime cause of the failure. Taking into 
account the uncertainty and the possible risks, the 
best strategy is accordingly to avoid a possible dis-
aster by changing the operational goals of the plant.
These examples illustrate the variety of diagnostic 
problems that typically should be handled by operators 
or automated systems in the supervision of industrial 
plants. In order to satisfy the demands, the supervisor 
must maintain an overview and analyze the situation in 
order be able to make a decision on what strategy to fol-
low and how to act. Skilled operators that can keep the 
plant running under a variety of disturbance situations, 
have the apparent ability to adapt their diagnostic activi-
ties to the actual plant operating situation. This capability 
is difficult to model and simulate in artificial intelligence 
programs because of the range of situations to be consid-
ered and because of the difficulties of defining the strate-
gies that control the interdependent concurrent reasoning 
processes that are involved. 
The modelling problem is further complicated be-
cause the plant knowledge required for diagnosis would 
be dependent on the diagnostic goal. If the goal is to re-
pair the failed component, knowledge of components and 
their locations would obviously be required. If the goal 
is to compensate for the failure there would be a need 
for knowing possible redundant standby components or 
other means to remediate the failure. If the goal is to pro-
tect the plant, knowledge about possible means of protec-
tion would be required. The plant knowledge to be used 
is therefore dependent on the task to be solved, i.e., it 
is determined by an interpretation of the plant physical 
features within a task context. 
2.2 Fault Analysis
In order to get an insight into the nature of these mod-
elling problems we will study the problems involved in 
fault analysis and fault tree construction. These problems 
may seem to have only indirect relevance for the inter-
pretation problems in plant supervision discussed above 
and will therefore be explained briefly.
  A fault tree is a logic description of the empirical re-
lations between a top event or state and its possible failure 
causes (Fig. 1 shows an example to be discussed later). A 
fault tree has two interpretations - a mathematical and a 
factual [4]. In the mathematical interpretation, elements 
of the fault tree (i.e., the boxes and the gate symbols) 
refer to propositions and logic operators, i.e., mathemati-
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be included in the fault tree. 
The following analysis will show that knowledge 
about the diagnostic goal and about the goals and func-
tions of the plant and its sub systems can motivate the 
content of the model. Usually, this knowledge, that can 
be represented using a functional modelling method like 
MFM, is not made explicit in fault tree analyses. The fac-
tual interpretation of the fault tree, i.e., its references to 
aspects of the physical world, is therefore dependent on 
implicit knowledge of the intentions of the engineer or 
operator of the plant. The building of fault trees is ac-
cordingly dependent on implicit assumptions about plant 
purposes and operational principles. 
The analysis of the fault tree will be done in two phas-
es. The first critical step is to hypothesize an objective 
for the diagnosis. If no assumptions are made about the 
use of the information in the fault tree, i.e., its signifi-
cance for the diagnostic problem, we cannot motivate the 
choice of fault states. In the second step of the analysis 
it will be shown that the orientation of diagnosis towards 
remedial action make the knowledge of the purposes of 
plant components and subsystems indispensable for the 
interpretation of the fault tree, i.e., for the definition of its 
factual meaning.  
2.2.2 The Diagnostic Task and Fault Tree Content
The overall purpose of diagnosis is to give directions 
for remedial action. There must therefore be a corre-
spondence, directly or indirectly, between states in the 
fault tree and possible actions on the system. If such cor-
respondence is absent, the model does not give informa-
tion that is relevant to a solution of the fault remediation 
problem. As an example, there is no direct corresponding 
remedial action in the cooling system in Fig 1. respond-
ing to the state “the current in the motor winding is zero” 
because it is not possible to influence the current directly. 
It should be done through manipulation of parameters 
which are under control, such as the start button. This 
state is therefore excluded from the model. However, the 
correspondence between plant events and remedial ac-
tions requires more analysis of predictive aspects and 
evaluative aspects of the fault trees as shown below. 
The temporal development of disturbances in dynam-
ic systems plays an important role in fault diagnosis, be-
cause the choice between alternative courses of remedial 
action is dependent on knowledge about the effects of a 
disturbance. If effects of the disturbance are not known, 
many alternatives of action may be possible and the su-
pervisor is faced with an incompletely defined decision 
problem. The supervisor must therefore make predictions 
of plant states and the model used for diagnosis must 
therefore have a predictive capability. The fault tree in 
Fig. 1 clearly satisfies this requirement since the states 
are interconnected in a causal chain from bottom to top.
Not all effects of a plant disturbance have conse-
quences for the plant operation. Only effects that threat-
a standby mode using the redundant seawater pump, P3; 
and 3) an auxiliary mode where the water in the tank is 
forced through the secondary side of the heat exchanger 
by gravitation. For each of these modes the stop valves 
have different positions (open or closed). The positions of 
the stop valves in Fig. 1 correspond to the normal mode. 
In the fault analysis it is assumed that the pump mo-
tor has stopped running. This fault may have a variety of 
consequences due to the physical interactions in the plant 
as shown in the fault tree in Fig. 1. Note that the fault 
tree is incomplete and it is therefore indicated that there 
may be several possible causes for each event in the tree. 
The fact that each event may have several consequences 
is also ignored. These simplifications are not critical here 
since the focus is on the problems in identifying the plant 
states that should be included in the fault tree. 
The model proposed is representative of what fault 
and consequence trees built by an expert doing fault 
analysis would look like. But it is not entirely obvious 
how to account for the criteria used in the selection of the 
initial event and its consequences. As an example: why is 
“Motor has stopped” selected as the initial event (cause); 
and why is “Pump P2 is not doing mechanical work” se-
lected as its consequence? The initial event could also 
have been described as ‘current in motor windings is 
zero.” In principle there are an infinite number of pos-
sible changes in the state of the motor and its subsystems, 
and these could be included depending on the level of 
resolution of the description in time and space. However, 
not all changes would be significant for diagnosing the 
plant, and only significant changes of plant state should 
Fig. 1. Example Fault Tree for the Ship Engine Cooling System
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designer to reach the goals, i.e., the possible actions and 
the plant equipment available. These dependencies exist, 
because each state in the fault tree describes the lack of a 
means of goal achievement. The remedial tasks and ac-
tions can therefore be derived from the state description 
and knowledge about means-end relations in the plant. 
This will be shown below by an analysis of each level 
in table 1. A full demonstration of all the details in the 
relations between fault trees and means-end models is 
not possible here; only indications will be presented. For 
convenience we will only consider levels 4, 3 and 2.
Level 4. S4 defines the plant state as a situation where 
the energy removed by the cooling system has been lost. 
The removal of the energy by the cooling system is a 
means for maintaining the energy balance (which again 
is a condition for keeping engine temperature within 
limits (G4)). The loss of engine cooling can be therefore 
remedied by producing energy balance, which is the pro-
posed task T4. 
Level 3. S4 describes the plant state as being in a loss 
of seawater flow. The goal G3 specifies the production 
of a coolant flow. In the context of G3, the function of 
the seawater is to be a coolant, i.e., to carry the energy 
transported by its circulation. Since the flow of seawater 
is lost, the cooling function is no longer available and the 
remedial task T3 is to produce flow of coolant by some 
other means. Since another commodity can be used as a 
coolant, namely the water in the tank, the action A3 is 
executed. A3 comprises two parts, a reconfiguration of 
the circuit and the startup of the auxiliary cooling system 
(opening control valve C4). The reconfiguration provides 
the conditions for the use of the tank and the associated 
piping as a transport path for the water in the tank. T3 in-
volves switching of stop valves S1, S3 and S5 to produce 
conditions for path availability. On level 3, the remedial 
action is decided by knowing that the tank water serves 
en the plant operational goals and constraints should be 
considered because they trigger remedial action. The 
predicted effects of disturbances must therefore also be 
evaluated, i.e., their consequences for the plant operation 
must be derived. 
In order to identify the content of the fault tree in 
Fig. 1 the sequence of fault states are analyzed in Table 
1. Each row in the table comprises corresponding sets 
of fault states, plant goals, remedial tasks and actions 
to be executed (note that each row represents different 
interpretation of the same observation that the pressure 
drop across the pump is zero). The diagnostic process in-
volves reasoning about the information in the columns 
in each row and between the rows. The table therefore 
combines plant operational goals (i.e., the plant states to 
be obtained) with goals of the supervisor, i.e., what to do. 
Supervision goals are called tasks here in order to avoid 
confusion caused by the use of the goal concept in differ-
ent meanings. A goal can refer to a desirable future state 
of the plant (the meaning used here) or it can refer to a 
future state of the doing of the action that produces the 
desirable plant state.
2.2.2.1 Relations between States and Plant Goals
From the first two columns, relating states and goals, 
it is seen that for each fault state there is a corresponding 
violated plant goal. The states are accordingly included in 
the fault tree because they describe states of significance 
to the achievement of plant goals (violations of plant 
constraints may also have been included in the example). 
The states represent, therefore, interpretations of the plant 
situation corresponding to each goal.
2.2.2.2 Relations between States, Tasks and Actions
The way in which plant states are described depends 
also on the knowledge of the means provided by the plant 
Sensor value State (meaning) Goal Remedial Task Remedial Action
dP is zero
S4:Engine cooling is lost G4:Maintain engine temperature within limits T4:Restore energy balance
A4:Reduce energy 
production
S3:No flow of seawater G3:Maintain coolant flow T3:Restore coolant flow
A3:Reconfigure and start 
auxiliary cooling system
S2:Pump P2 is not doing 
mechanical work G2:Produce pressure T2:Restore pressure A2:Reconfigureand start P3
S1:The pump motor has 
stopped G1:Keep pump running
T1:Restore pump 
revolutions A1:Start pump motor
Table 1.  The Significance of Plant States Depends on the Plant Goal in View. Each State Interpretation is Associated with the 
Remedial Task to do. for Each Task There is a Set of Corresponding Actions.
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its subsystems and components. It can be concluded from 
the analysis that the reasoning required to correlate states 
and goals with tasks and actions on all levels depends 
on knowing the functions provided by plant components 
and subsystems for goal achievement. These relations are 
implicit in the fault tree but can be represented explicitly 
in a functional model like MFM as demonstrated below. 
Due to the four interpretations of the plant situa-
tion, there would be four ways to respond to the failure 
depending upon the goal to be pursued. The selection 
between these alternatives depends on the multiple in-
terpretations of the plant state, the time available for re-
mediation and the priorities of the individual goals. All 
levels of interpretation are therefore required in order to 
make a qualified diagnosis. If levels are ignored, it will 
not be possible to consider alternative courses of action, 
i.e., the reliability of plant operations will be reduced 
(more shut-downs). Furthermore, if levels are ignored, 
the risk of making the wrong decision will be increased. 
We therefore need plant models which can provide mul-
tiple interpretations. This is a key feature of Multilevel 
Flow Modelling. 
3. MULTILEVEL FLOW MODELLING
Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM) is a methodol-
ogy for the functional modelling of industrial processes 
on several interconnected levels of means-end and part-
whole abstractions. The basic idea of MFM is to repre-
sent an industrial plant as a system which provides the 
means required to serve purposes in its environment. 
MFM has a primary focus on representation of plant 
goals and functions and provides a methodological way 
of using those concepts to represent a complex industrial 
plant. The basic idea of MFM was conceived by the first 
author [2] and has been developed and used over the 
years by his research group and by research groups in 
several other countries including Sweden, the USA, Ja-
pan and China. Early MFM research originated in prob-
lems of representing complex systems in human machine 
interfaces for supervisory control. But it has since devel-
oped into a broader research field dealing with modelling 
for analysis, design and operation of automation systems 
for safety critical complex plants. Recent introductions 
to MFM and various aspects of its applications are pre-
sented in [6, 7, 8, 9, and 10]. 
3.1 Concepts of Multilevel Flow Modelling
Concepts of means-end and whole-part decomposi-
tion and aggregation play a foundational role in MFM. 
These concepts enable people, like systems engineers and 
plant operators, to cope with complexity because they fa-
cilitate reasoning on different levels of abstraction. The 
power of means-end and part-whole concepts in deal-
ing with complexity has roots in natural language. But 
the same function as the seawater and that the tank and 
the piping can serve as a means of mass transport in a 
field of gravity.
Level 2. When the goal in view is that pressure is 
produced (G2), the plant state is described as a failure of 
the pump to perform work on the coolant (S2). The pump 
P2 is a means of producing pressure on the fluid.  Since 
P2 is not able to work on the fluid (the pump motor has 
stopped) another means of pressure production must be 
used in order to remediate the situation (T2). The reme-
dial action, A2, is to put in service and use the stand-by 
pump, P3, serving the same function as P2. A2 comprises 
a circuit reconfiguration task (switching of stop valves 
S1, S2 and S3 and S4 to produce conditions for enabling 
P3) and subsequently the start of P3. On this level, the 
action is decided on the basis of knowing that P2 and P3 
have the same function.  
2.2.2.3 Relations between the Levels
The discussion above did not consider the relations 
between state descriptions at the various levels. As men-
tioned previously, the states provide different descrip-
tions of the same plant situation and are related to de-
cision contexts with different goals and associated tasks 
and actions in supervision of the plant operations. In 
addition to these ‘horizontal’ dependencies, the states in 
Table 1 are related ‘vertically’ through causal links. Thus, 
if the pump stops, pump P2 is not doing mechanical work 
on the seawater. This, in turn, will cause the circulation 
in the seawater cooling circuit to fail. Finally, the engine 
will lose cooling. The fault states are in this way con-
nected by cause-effect relations that gives the fault tree 
its predictive capability. 
However, each state has also an evaluative content 
because it is derived by evaluating the consequence of 
the state on the level below for the goal in view. Thus, S4 
is the consequence of S3 in view of G4; S3 is the conse-
quence of S2 in view of G3; and S2 is the consequence 
of S1 in view of G2. 
The relations between levels reflect both the chains 
of cause and effect and the organization of the functions 
of the engine cooling system in a means-end chain. The 
sequence of levels (1, 2, 3, 4) therefore determines the 
order in which the different state descriptions become 
relevant for an understanding of the plant situation and 
the order in which the possible courses of action are af-
fected. MFM models represent this knowledge of causal 
relations by the linking of functional levels via means-
end relations. 
2.3 Summary of the Analysis
In summary, the analysis shows that the derivation of 
the fault tree state sequence is based on two sources of 
plant knowledge: 1) knowledge about the physical caus-
al mechanism of the cooling system and 2) knowledge 
about goals and functions of the ship cooling system and 
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3.1.1 Fundamental features of MFM models
A particular feature of MFM is a clear separation 
of plant components and functions. This means that 
the same component or subsystem may be represented 
by several functions, and a function may be realized by 
alternative components or subsystems. These many-to-
many mappings between means (components or subsys-
tems) and ends (functions) are explained in detail in [11]. 
The PWR model presented below includes several exam-
ples of one-to-many mappings between components and 
functions.
3.1.2 Principles and tools for building MFM models 
Building an MFM model is not a simple task. First of 
all, the model builder must have a good general knowl-
edge about the plant and how it is operated. But the mod-
el construction is an iterative process and there is a need 
for modeling strategies and for support tools [12]. The 
MFMSuite [13] under development by DTU and OECD 
Halden, includes a graphical editor with library facilities 
supporting reuse during the modelling process. 
There are two basic principles for building MFM 
models. According to the first principle, the building of 
a model takes its departure in the definition of objectives 
of the modelling object or system. The system func-
tions that are provided to achieve the objectives are then 
identified. The purpose of this top down procedure is to 
ensure that functions are defined in the context of sys-
natural language is not efficient for representing and rea-
soning about means-end and part-whole abstractions of 
complex physical artifacts. MFM development draws on 
insights from the semantic structure of natural language 
but is designed as an artificial language which can serve 
modelling needs of complex engineering domains which 
cannot be handled within the common sense limitations 
of natural language. 
Functions are represented by elementary flow and 
control functions interconnected to form functional 
structures representing a particular goal oriented view 
of the system. In the action theoretical foundation which 
is under development, MFM functions are instances of 
more generic action types [8]. The views represented by 
the functional structures are related by means-end rela-
tions and comprise together a comprehensive model of 
the functional organization of the system. 
The basic MFM modelling concepts are shown in Ta-
ble 2 and comprise objectives, flow structures, a set of 
functional primitives (flow functions and control func-
tions), and a set of means-end and influence relations 
representing purpose related dependencies between func-
tions and objectives and among the functions themselves. 
The functions, the functional structures and the relations 
are interconnected to form a hyper-graph like structure. 
The symbols used to represent functions, objectives and 
functional structures are shown in Table 2 together with 
symbols used for representing means-end and influence 
relations. 
Functions
 Relations
Table 2.  Basic MFM Symbols
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The objective of the system represented by obj1 is to 
maintain the removal of heat from the energy source. The 
energy flow structure efs1 represents the transportation 
of energy from the engine (the energy source sou1) to 
the sea which is an energy sink sin1. The heat storage ca-
pacity of the system is represented by an energy storage 
function sto1 (the open sea water loop does not have the 
storage function in this case). The balance function bal1 
represents the function of the heat exchanger.
The mass flow structures mfs1 and mfs2 model rep-
resents the mass functions of the closed fresh water loop 
and the sea water loop respectively. Note that in the pre-
sent model we do not consider injection of coolant water 
and venting. Therefore, the closed loop fresh water cir-
culation is represented by a storage function sto3 and a 
transport function tra6 connected into a loop. The mass 
functions of the sea in mfs2 are considered as both an 
unlimited mass source sou2 and a sink sin2. Sea water 
is delivered from the source to the sink by two alterna-
tive transport functions, tra5 and tra10, representing the 
functions of the main pump P2 and the alternative pump 
P3. In addition to the sea water, an auxiliary cooling sys-
tem serves as another water source sou3 in mfs2. Stor-
age sto4 represents the function of the water tank of the 
auxiliary system.
The energy flow structure efs2, efs3, and efs4 repre-
sent the energy conversions within the three pumps. The 
energy conversion functions of a pump are described al-
ready in detail elsewhere (e.g. [6]) and will therefore be 
omitted here.
Flow structures can be connected with different 
means-end relations in MFM. For example, tra4 in mfs1 
represent the function of pump P1 which is water trans-
portation. Water transportation is the primary means of 
mediating the energy removal from the engine to the 
coolant loop tra1. Similarly, tra6 in mfs2 is linked to the 
energy level by a mediate relation to tra3 which repre-
sents the energy transport from the heat exchanger to the 
sea. The energy levels for the different pumps can also be 
linked to their target (transport) functions on the material 
level.
One may notice that different so-called casual roles 
are used between adjacent flow functions within the flow 
structures. These casual roles do not represent flow func-
tions or direction of flow (which is indicated by the arrow 
in the transport functions). They indicate how the state of 
a function influences its upstream or downstream func-
tions indicated by the flow directions. The casual roles 
will be explained after the introduction to MFM reason-
ing below.
3.2 Using MFM for Diagnostic Reasoning
MFM modelling is not only a way of representation, 
but also a convenient tool to analyze and reason about the 
system performance [14]. Reasoning in MFM models is 
based on dependency relations between states of objec-
tives and functions. 
tem objectives. The procedure is suitable, in particular, 
for modelling systems where the physical realization is 
not known in detail or taken into account such as in the 
early phases of system design. The second principle is 
to associate functions with system components, i.e., the 
physical realization. These functions are then aggregated 
so that they match with the objectives of the system. This 
bottom up procedure is suitable when the plant objectives 
are unknown or vaguely defined. The aggregation pro-
cess serves here to suggest possible objectives and higher 
level functions in the system which cannot be directly as-
sociated with physical components or subsystems. 
In most cases the two basic principles are combined 
into an iterative procedure. The model of the ship engine 
cooling system presented below is the result of such an 
iterative procedure. For more complex modelling tasks, 
such as the nuclear power PWR and FBR cases present-
ed below,  the modelling procedures become rather time 
consuming if not done by an expert. An obvious way to 
reduce the modelling effort is to reuse model components 
from a library of tested and validated models. Another 
means of reducing the modelling effort is to use decom-
position strategies for breaking down the system into 
subsystems and then building the MFM models by com-
bining the MFM models of the subsystems. This strategy 
is exemplified in the FBR example presented below. The 
combination of MFM sub-models is not a trivial task be-
cause of the many-to-many mappings between physical 
structure and function, and the adaptations which may 
be necessary when a model component is used in a new 
context.
3.1.3 MFM modelling of the ship engine cooling  
  system
An easy way to understand how MFM concepts are 
used is to consider the modelling of the ship engine cool-
ing system presented in Fig. 2. By this example we can 
explore a large fraction of the concepts shown in Table. 2. 
The interested reader can find other examples described 
in [6].
The MFM model of the ship engine cooling system 
is based on the system description presented in section 
2.2.1 and the modelling principles in section 3.1.2. The 
purpose of the system is to prevent overheating of the 
ship engine. This purpose is achieved by transporting the 
heat (energy) generated by the engine, by means of two 
cooling loops, to the sea. The energy transportation is in 
turn obtained by using two cooling loops. Two pumps are 
used to move the freshwater and the seawater along the 
two cooling loops. This overall description of the means 
and the ends of the system gives a general outline for 
modelling the system using MFM and can be represented 
diagrammatically as shown in Fig. 3. 
With this overall model as a basis, we can develop an 
MFM model using several steps of iteration and refine-
ment. The model is shown in Fig. 4.and explained below.
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Fig. 2. The Ship Engine Cooling System
Fig. 3. Means-end Analysis for the Ship Engine Cooling System.
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sto2 and tra4. The mass flow rate represented by the state 
of tra4 is determined by an active pump. Therefore, sto2 
is connected by a participant role to tra4 both from up-
stream and downstream directions, (meaning that the 
flow rate is independent on the state of the storage func-
tion). However, in mfs2, sto3, that represent the storage 
function of the water tank, has the potential to influence 
the downstream injection of water into the sea water loop. 
Therefore, sto3 is connected with an influencer role with 
the downstream transport tra8.
3.2.3 MFM patterns
Based on the function states and the causal relations 
between different functions, reasoning rules can be de-
fined for a generic set of MFM reasoning patterns sum-
marized in Table 4. The rules are derived from the pattern 
3.2.1 MFM Function States
Each function can be either enabled or disabled. For 
any enabled function, the possible states are listed in Ta-
ble 3. Note that a disabled function, rather than being rep-
resented as another state of the function, is considered to 
be no longer available. For example, a no-flow transport 
is different from a disabled transport.
3.2.2 MFM Causal Roles
The casual roles in MFM represent how non-transport 
functions influence the upstream or downstream flow 
within a flow structure. To demonstrate how to use causal 
roles in MFM modelling, the previous cooling system is 
used.
The flow structure mfs1 in Fig. 4, representing the 
functions of the fresh water loop, contains two functions: 
Function/Target Normal State Abnormal State
balance normal leak block sourcing
barrier normal leak
transport normal low-low low high high-high
sink normal low-low low high high-high
source normal low-low low high high-high
storage normal low-low low high high-high
objective normal false
threat normal false
Table 3.  States of MFM Functions
STORAGE SINK / SOURCE BALANCE
Table 4.  MFM Reasoning Patterns
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purposes of comparison, the energy removal is selected 
as the starting point of the reasoning. The state of tra1 in 
the model is specified as low flow and the fault diagnosis 
is run by using the MFM model. Three primary possi-
ble causes are deduced by the reasoning engine: 1) the 
closed loop water circulation is in fault condition (tra4); 
2) the heat exchanger in the energy level is fault condi-
tion (bal1), and 3) the sea water loop is in fault condition 
(bal2, tra5, tra10, and sou3).
One of the causes was analyzed in Section 2; namely 
that the loss of energy removal capability is caused by a 
lack of energy flow from the heat exchanger to the sea 
(low flow in tra3). One of the causes for this may be that 
the primary pump cannot serve its function to transport 
the water in the sea water loop (low flow in tra5). From 
tra5, the reasoning can be continued to trace the energy 
conversion within the pump. The reasoning path pro-
duced by the reasoning system is: (“>” means “can be 
because of”)
Objective (false) 
> Overall Energy Level {tra1(low) > sto1(high)>tra2
(low)>tra3(low)} 
>Water Mass Level {tra6(low)>tra5(low)} 
> Pump Energy Level {tra15(low)>sto6(low)>
tra14(low)>sou5(low)}
It is seen that the reasoning result from an MFM mod-
el corresponds to the analysis presented in Section 2. The 
fault trees (and consequence trees) are generated by the 
MFM reasoning by the interpretation of an initial event 
using the rules and model. Note that MFM reasoning will 
by the following principle: If either the transport function 
states or the non-transport function state is known (gray) 
or can be assumed, then based on the causal roles, a hy-
pothesis of the other function states can be inferred. 
In a complete MFM model, the reasoning can start 
at whichever function in the model, and propagate to an 
end-node in the model through various MFM patterns. It 
should be noted, that for each MFM reasoning pattern, 
not only a prediction can be made (about a possible con-
sequence) but also a postdiction (a possible cause) can be 
drawn from a function state. Using the storage pattern for 
example, one may draw two conclusions from a storage-
influencer-transport pattern assuming that the storage is 
in a low volume state: 1) The consequence may be that 
the downstream transport will have a low flow rate; and 
2) The cause may be that the downstream transport had 
a high flow rate.  Reasoning about causes and conse-
quences are separate processes: the former is reasoning 
forwards in time and the latter backward.
The latest version of the MFM causal reasoning 
rules for both causes and consequences reasoning are 
presented in [15]. The reasoning rules and the inference 
mechanisms are implemented using a rule-based reason-
ing system which is integrated with a model editor in the 
MFMSuite [13]. 
3.2.4 Diagnosis of ship engine cooling system
We will use the model in Fig. 4 to demonstrate diag-
nostic reasoning in MFM reasoning. The reasoning re-
sults will be compared to the fault tree analysis. For the 
Fig. 4. Means-end Analysis for the Ship Engine Cooling System.
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Fig. 5. Reasoning Result.
Fig. 6. The Primary Side of the PWR System (with the Safety Injection System) to be Modelled.
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(CVCS), and a safety injection system. In the modeled 
unit the low pressure safety injection pumps are com-
bined with residual heat removal pumps, and the high 
pressure injection pump is combined with the inlet charg-
ing pump from the CVCS. The control rods, which are 
not illustrated in the diagram, are also included in the 
modelling. In the following, a step by step explanation 
is provided which demonstrate the MFM modelling of a 
PWR system.
According to the modelling procedure in section 
3.1.2, objectives and mass/energy flows need to be deter-
mined first. The main operational objective for the PWR 
primary system is to generate and transport energy (in 
the form of heat). This objective is achieved by trans-
porting the heat produced in the reactor to the SGs. The 
energy will be further transported from the primary side 
coolant loop to the secondary steam line inside the SGs. 
The energy is transported by means of the water circu-
lation in the RCLs. The objectives can be summarized 
as 1) maintain heat production, 2) maintain delivery of 
produced heat for power production, 3) maintain water 
level in RCS, 4) maintain water circulation in RCS, 5) 
maintain the average temperature and pressure (energy 
level) in the system.
Two major flow structures (one energy flow and one 
mass flow) can be easily identified. Furthermore, there 
are two means of influencing the reactivity and thereby 
the energy production in the system: one means is to 
move the control rods, and the other is to inject boron 
through the CVCS. The functions of these two means of 
influencing energy production can be represented by two 
additional mass flow structures.
Considering the energy flow structure RC_energy, 
the reactor is considered to be a source of energy, and two 
energy sinks can be identified. The first energy sink is the 
function provided by the secondary system (which uses 
the heat generated in the reactor to produce steam, which 
generate all possible cause and consequence paths, which 
can be derived from and be consistent with the means-
end relations included. The first principles of operation 
embedded in the MFM model ensure both consistency 
and completeness (within the scope of the model). 
   
4. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT APPLICATIONS
MFM has been used for both reliability analysis and 
for diagnosing nuclear power plants. Yang et. al. [16] use 
MFM for reliability studies of nuclear power plants and 
demonstrate that MFM can be used to generate fault trees 
which are more complete than those produced by tradi-
tional manual procedures. Zhang[15] (the second author 
of this paper) has developed a comprehensive MFM 
model of the primary coolant loop of a PWR to be used 
together with the MFM reasoning system in a pilot exper-
iment on diagnosis with the Ringhals simulator at OECD 
Halden, Norway. Lind et.al. [17] developed an MFM 
model of the FBR Monju demonstrating the use of MFM 
to model a nuclear power plant and its associated control 
systems. The PWR and FBR studies summarized below 
demonstrate the ability of MFM models to represent the 
complexity of nuclear power plants. The PWR study 
demonstrates the modelling procedure described above 
for a complex system. The FBR study demonstrates how 
decomposition and reuse strategies can be used to reduce 
the modelling effort.   
4.1 Model of a PWR primary system
The PWR primary system considered in [17] includes 
three Reactor Coolant Loops (RCL) as shown in Fig. 6. 
Each RCL contains a Steam Generator (SG), a Reactor 
Coolant Pump (RCP) and a cold-leg collector (CC) con-
nected to the main circulation pipeline. The pressurizer 
surge line is connected to the second RCL. The system 
also includes a Chemical and Volume Control System 
Fig. 7. MFM Model of the Primary Side Energy Flow.
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capacity of the reactor vessel, the SGs, CCs and the pres-
surizer. Fig. 8 shows an MFM model of the RCLs with 
the pressurizer. The transport function tra_ps represents 
the function of the pressurizer spray line.
However, from an operational perspective, the Re-
actor Coolant System (RCS) is failing when any single 
cooling loop fails to meet the operational requirements. 
From a functional perspective it is therefore reason-
able to represent (through abstraction) the three reactor 
cooling loops as one coolant loop. This offers a simpler 
model with full representation of the RCS functions. The 
functions of the make-up system is not considered in this 
study, so the CVCS can be considered as the water stor-
age with an open loop from a source to a sink (omitting 
the recycling of the boron and water) that is connected 
directly to influence the water level in the RCS. So in 
the general model, the CVCS and the RCS can be repre-
sented in MFM as in Fig. 9. The water storage function 
in turn moves the turbine to generate electric power and 
deliver the power further into the grid). The second en-
ergy sink is the function provided by the emergency cool-
ing system. The model of the energy flow is shown in 
Fig. 7. Note that the function names of the partial models 
shown in the figures are not definite, they may vary from 
the final complete model shown in Fig. 10. 
The flow function tra44 represents the transportation 
of the generated heat from the primary to the secondary 
side during normal energy production. The remaining 
heat will be circulated back to the general energy storage, 
represented by sto_heat, through the cold legs. During 
emergency situations, when the function sin_pp is not 
available, the energy is removed through sin_em, by us-
ing the facilities for emergency cooling.
The mass flow structure can be considered as a closed 
system during operation and modelled only using dif-
ferent storage functions representing the water storage 
Fig. 9. Abstract MFM Mass Flow Structures of RCS an CVCS Systems.
Fig. 8. MFM Model Mass Flow of Three RCLs and Pressurizer.
LIND et al.,  Functional Modelling for Fault Diagnosis and its Application for NPP
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.46  NO.6  DECEMBER 2014768
structures provides the means to transport water in dif-
ferent parts of the coolant mass flow in mfs1. For the 
purpose of demonstration, an additional function of the 
charging pump is also modelled in Fig.10, which is to 
provide the pressure for RCP seals. In Fig 10 bar1 is a 
barrier representing the seal function which is condi-
tioned by the pump energy flow. However, during normal 
operation, the water flow through the pump seals is too 
small to make an impact on the system function, and thus 
can be neglected during the modelling.
A fourth energy flow structure not yet mentioned is 
efs5, which represents the pressure control function of 
the pressurizer. The pressurizer is an important compo-
nent of the PWR system and requires a detailed energy 
balance representation. The energy flow structure efs5 is 
overlapping with efs1 because the function of the pres-
surizer is to control the pressure of the whole primary 
system. Therefore, efs5 can also be viewed as a detailed 
representation of sto8 in efs1. Because it has been de-
cided to model the pressurizer vapor phase (sto20) and 
liquid phase (sto22) separately in efs5, in order to repre-
sent the functional aspects of the thermal dynamic, the 
function of the pressurizer represented in the mass flow 
structure mfs1 is also decomposed into vapor storage and 
liquid storage. Between the mass flow and energy flow 
structure of the pressurizer dynamic, the energy accumu-
lated together in the two different phases drives the phase 
of the VCT tank is represented in Fig. 9 by sto_vct. Ad-
ditionally, another source can be considered in the mass 
flow, namely the function of the Reactor Water Storage 
Tank (RWST). There is also another sink function which 
is realized by the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT). 
After the partial models of the PWR primary have 
been developed, they can be combined with a few modi-
fications (adding additional storages, balances, and trans-
ports) to produce a complete MFM model of the PWR 
including the means-end relations between the flow 
structures. A complete MFM model of the PWR primary 
side is shown in Fig. 10. Notice that four additional en-
ergy flow structures not mentioned above have been add-
ed to the model; namely the energy flow structures efs2, 
efs3 and efs4. They represent the energy flows within the 
RCPs, the high head safety injection pump (also used as 
CVCS charging pump), and the low head safety injec-
tion pumps (also used as Residual Heat Removal Pumps), 
respectively.  
Boron injections and control rod insertions are repre-
sented by separate mass flow structures, mfs2 and mfs3. 
Here we consider the storage function as the total amount 
of boron, or inserted rods, which influences the reactivity 
in the reactor. Transport functions from the source and to 
the sink represent the process of injection and removal, 
respectively.
The main function in each of these three energy flow 
Fig. 10. A Complete MFM Model of the PWR Primary System.
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pings, i.e., models of functions and components are not 
isomorphic.  A decomposition of the plant into compo-
nents accordingly cannot address functional constraints 
(and the reverse). The three subsystems, PHTS, SHTS 
and ECS correspond to the decomposition used by the 
plant engineers and operators.
It is shown in [17] that the decomposition of the FBR 
Monju into the three subsystems suggested above, make 
it possible to use an MFM model of a generic heat trans-
fer loop as a template for building MFM models of the 
PHTS and the SHTS subsystems. But since the subsys-
tems do not strictly match the functional decomposition 
of MFM, subsystem functions have been represented as 
partial or incomplete function structures (see [17] for de-
tails). However, even though the function structures for 
the PHTS systems, the SHTS system and ECS are incom-
plete they can be directly combined into the “complete” 
function structures of MONJU shown in Fig. 11. Below 
we will provide brief descriptions of each of the sub-
models. The control functions included in the modes will 
not be described. The reader is referred to [17] for details. 
4.2.1 Primary heat transfer system PHTS
The components in the primary heat transfer system 
PHTS includes the reactor with control rods, the CRMD 
controller, the reactor power controller, the sodium cool-
ant, the IHX heat exchanger, the PHTS circulation pump, 
the PHTS circulation pump controller and the PHTS flow 
controller. The MFM sub-model of the PHTS system is 
shown in Fig. 11. The PHTS sub-model contains three 
functional levels: efs1, mfs1 and efs4. The functions in 
structure efs1 represent the pumping and hydraulic func-
tions of the PHST involved in the conversion of electrical 
energy to rotational and kinetic energy in the hydraulic 
circuit. The structure mfs1 represents the storage (sto4) of 
sodium in the core and its circular transportation (tra10) 
and includes also a source sou4 representing the radioac-
tive material in the core and two barrier functions bar1 
and bar2. The barrier bar1 represents the function of the 
cladding. The barrier bar2 represents a function of the 
IHX heat exchanger which is to separate the primary and 
the secondary coolant media so that radioactive materials 
in the PHTS coolant is prevented from entering the SHTS 
system. The structure efs4 represents the delivery (sou5), 
transfer (tra21) and storage (sto7) of energy in the reactor 
coolant circuit. The transfer of energy from the PHTS to 
the SHTS mediated by the circulation of coolant is rep-
resented by tra22 including its connection with tra10 in 
mfs1 by a mediation relation. 
4.2.2 Secondary heat transfer system SHTS
The components in the SHTS subsystem include the 
IHX heat exchanger, the SHTS circulation pump, the 
evaporator EV and the super-heater SH. The main pur-
pose of the SHTS system is to transfer energy from the 
PHTS system to ECS. The MFM sub-model of SHTS sys-
transitions, while at the same time, energy is transported 
alongside the phase changes. The MFM means-end rela-
tion producer-product is used to describe the influence 
from energy storages sto20 and sto22 to the mass trans-
ports tra6 and tra5, while the MFM mediate relations are 
used to describe the influence from the mass transports 
tra6 and tra5 to the energy transports tra52 and tra51. 
The objectives summarized in the beginning of Sec-
tion 4.1 can be correlated with the objectives represented 
in Fig. 10. Objective 1 and 2 are represented by obj2 and 
obj5. Objective 3 and 4 are represented by and obj3, and 
objective 5 is represented by obj6.
Note that decomposition is done in the model. For 
example, the storage sto13 and balance bal3 functions 
are added to fully describe the function of the CCs in 
the system. The model presented in this section is still a 
highly abstract functional representation of the process, 
however, but it serves well for the purposes of demon-
strating the modelling capability of MFM. The ability to 
choose the level of abstraction which fits the purpose of 
the model is one of MFM’s features which make it attrac-
tive for dealing with complexity. 
The causal relations between different functions with-
in a flow structure allow the model to be used for causal 
reasoning as explained in Section 3.3.
4.2 Modelling a FBR
The second nuclear power plant modelling example 
is the MFM model developed from the FBR Monju [17]. 
This model was developed by a decomposition strategy 
which increased the efficiency of the modelling process. 
The basic combined top down and bottom up modelling 
approach illustrated with the PWR example can be very 
costly, and strategies which can reduce the modelling ef-
fort are highly desirable, and even necessary, for practi-
cal applications. The FBR modelling also included rep-
resentation of the function of control systems. Interested 
readers are referred to [17] for detailed explanations of 
the modelling strategy and the representation of con-
trol systems. Here we will only summarize the model-
ling strategy used for decomposition which has features 
which can be generalized to other types of nuclear plants 
and processes in other engineering domains where MFM 
is used (e.g. in oil and gas). 
The MFM model of the FBR Monju was built by de-
composing the plant into the following three subsystems
•  Primary heat transfer system (PHTS)
•  Secondary heat transfer system (SHTS)
•  Energy conversion system (ECS)
Each subsystem and the included components will be 
defined below. 
Note that this decomposition into systems is reflected 
neither in a P&I diagram of the plant nor in the MFM 
model. The P&I decompose into components or equip-
ment and MFM decompose into levels of function. Func-
tions and components are related by many-to-many map-
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and the MFM sub-model of the ECS is by far the most 
complex of the three sub-models in Fig.11. The functions 
in efs3 are similar to efs2 in describing the functions of 
the SHTS. The energy aspects of the pumping are repre-
sented by efs3. The power supply to the feed water pump 
is represented by sou3, the energy conversion to kinetic 
energy of the feed water is represented by tra8 and by 
tra9 which represents the losses due to pressure drops in 
the circuit including the pressure drop caused by the feed 
water control valve. Considering the mass flow structure 
mfs1, a natural place to start is at the transport function 
tra18 which represents the transportation of feed water 
by the pump. The balance bal1, located upstream to tra18, 
represents the balancing of the feed flow with the output 
flow (tra12) to the moisture separator performed by the 
evaporator (EV). The separation is represented by the 
balance function bal2 and the three transport functions 
tem is shown in Fig. 11. The SHTS sub-model includes 
three barrier functions bar2 and bar3 and bar4. These 
three barriers represent safety functions of the SHTS, 
which is to prevent the transfer of radioactive material 
between the PHTS and the ECS (through the evaporator 
EV and the super-heater SH). In function structure efs4, 
representing the energy transfer function (tra23) of the 
SHTS system, we have included a storage function (sto8) 
representing the storage of heat in the coolant and the 
components in the SHTS circuit. 
4.1.3 Energy conversion system ECS
The main components of the energy conversion sys-
tem includes the evaporator EV, the super heater SH, the 
moisture separator, the feed water pump, the turbine 
generator and the condenser and the condensate pump. 
The functions of these components are highly interactive 
Fig. 11. MFM Model of the FBR Monju.
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on Nuclear Safety and Simulation hosted by CNST at 
Harbin Engineering University, and by the IFE OECD 
Halden Reactor Project in Norway through the co-fund-
ing of Xinxin Zhang’s PhD project and the joint develop-
ment of the MFMSuite.
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tra19, tra14 and tra15. The water separated from the 
steam (tra19) is returned to the main feed water line. This 
is represented by bal4 which combines the flow from the 
condenser pump (tra20) with the separated water (tra19). 
The transportation of superheated steam produced by SH 
is represented by tra14 and is used for control. The trans-
port tra15 represent the transportation of steam from the 
evaporator output directly to the point (bal3) where it is 
mixed with the superheated steam. From bal3 there are 
two flow paths represented by tra16 and tra17. These 
functions represent the turbine (tra16) and the bypass 
line to the condenser whose function is represented by 
sto6 since its purpose is to collect the water condensed 
by the turbine and the bypass flow. 
The balance function bal5 in efs4 represents the ag-
gregated function of the SHTS side of the evaporator EV 
and the super-heater SH. The two energy transport func-
tions tra24 and tra25 represent the energy transferred 
from the SHTS to the secondary sides of the evaporator 
(tra25) and the super-heater (tra24). The energy accumu-
lation in the evaporator and super-heater are represented 
by sto9 and sto19, and tra26 and tra27 represent the ener-
gy transfers from the EV and the SH to the turbine by the 
steam. The conversion of energy in the turbine-generator 
is represented by tra28, bal6, tra29 and tra30. Transport 
tra29 represents here the transfer of the electric energy 
generated by the generator to the grid represented by the 
sink function sin8. Transport tra30 represents the transfer 
of energy to the condenser which here for simplicity is 
represented as sin9. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The paper presents functional modelling and its appli-
cation for diagnosis in nuclear power plants. Functional 
modelling is defined and its relevance for coping with 
the complexity of diagnosis in large scale systems like 
nuclear plants is explained. The diagnosis task is ana-
lyzed and it is demonstrated that the levels of abstrac-
tion in models for diagnosis must reflect plant knowledge 
about goals and functions which is represented in func-
tional modelling. Multilevel flow modelling, which is a 
functional modelling methodology, is introduced briefly 
and illustrated with a cooling system example. The use 
of MFM for reasoning about causes and consequences 
is explained in detail and demonstrated by the cooling 
system example. MFM modelling applications in nuclear 
power systems are described by two examples: a PWR 
and an FBR reactor. The PWR example describes a top 
down modelling approach and the FBR example show 
how the modelling development effort can be reduced by 
proper strategies.
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